Unobservable Persistant Productivity and Long Term Contracts

We study the problem of a firm that faces asymmetric information about the productivity of its potential workers. In our framework, a worker’s productivity is either assigned by nature at birth, or determined by an unobservable initial action of the worker that has persistent effects over time. We provide a characterization of the optimal dynamic compensation scheme that attracts only high productivity workers: consumption –regardless of time period– is ranked according to likelihood ratios of output histories, and the inverse of the marginal utility of consumption satisfies the martingale property derived in Rogerson (1985). However, in the case of i.i.d. output and square root utility we show that, contrary to the features of the optimal contract for a repeated moral hazard problem, the level and the variance of consumption are negatively correlated, due to the influence of early luck into future compensation. Moreover, in this example long-term inequality is lower under persistent private informatio

Labor Market Policies and Employment Duration: The Effects of Labor Market Reform in Argentina

Over the last few years, the debate on labor market reform has been at the center of economic policy debate in Argentina. This debate has been fueled by the sustained growth in the unemployment rate observed during the decade. One of the major targets of the attack on labor market regulation has been high dismissal costs. Attempts to reduce dismissal costs for all existing jobs have faced strong opposition. As a compromise, and to stimulate job creation, employment promotion contracts for new jobs were introduced in 1995. These contracts are limited to a fixed term ranging from three months to two years.

Nash Bargaining with Downward Rigid Wages

We study the effect of downward wage rigidity in a dynamic model when wages are negotiated according to Nash bargaining. Downward rigidity causes a decrease in the worker’s expected utility. For the firms the effect is ambiguous.Publicad

Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

We develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints. Borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced. In the model, the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints. In fact, borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement: The value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short term capital, but is itself determined by future access to credit. This dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints, where the ability to raise short term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt. We characterize the optimal default-free contract -which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories- and derive implications for firm growth, survival, and leverage. The model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms. Comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived.Financial constraints, imperfect enforcement, firm dynamics, capital structure, debt maturity.

Latin America in the Twentieth Century: Stagnation, then Collapse

Most Latin American countries experienced their last peak in output per capita relative to the United States’ between 1971 and 1982. Prior to this peak per capita output was rapidly catching up to the developed world. Twenty years after the peak the average country’s relative per capita output was 68% of its peak level. A growth accounting exercise shows that between 1960 and 1985 the contribution of physical capital to growth, at 74%, was more than twice the world’s average. There is an investment/productivity puzzle since capital accumulation was among the highest in the world and productivity growth one of the lowest. Import Substitution Industrialization and targeted investment subsidies may be the key to understanding Latin America’s lack of developmentStagnation, Growth, Latin America

Duration and Risk of Unemployment in Argentina

After a decade of structural reforms, unemployment rates have tripled in Argentina. This paper is concerned with the measurement of unemployment risk and its distribution. We show the importance of considering re-incidence in the measurement of unemployment risk and develop a methodolgy to do that. Our estimates for Argentina show that, though the typical unemployment spell is short, once re-incidence is taken into account, unemployment risk is high, has risen substantially in the last decade and is shared very unequally in the labor force. This counters the established view that unemployment is a small risk, short-duration phenomenon, which arises when re-incidence is not considered.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39861/3/wp476.pd

Unobservable Persistant Productivity and Long Term Contracts

We study the problem of a firm that faces asymmetric information about the productivity of its potential workers. In our framework, a worker’s productivity is either assigned by nature at birth, or determined by an unobservable initial action of the worker that has persistent effects over time. We provide a characterization of the optimal dynamic compensation scheme that attracts only high productivity workers: consumption –regardless of time period– is ranked according to likelihood ratios of output histories, and the inverse of the marginal utility of consumption satisfies the martingale property derived in Rogerson (1985). However, in the case of i.i.d. output and square root utility we show that, contrary to the features of the optimal contract for a repeated moral hazard problem, the level and the variance of consumption are negatively correlated, due to the influence of early luck into future compensation. Moreover, in this example long-term inequality is lower under persistent private informationMechanism design, Moral hazard, Persistence

Risk Taking by Entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs bear substantial risk, but empirical evidence shows no sign of a positive premium. This paper develops a theory of endogenous entrepreneurial risk taking that explains why self-financed entrepreneurs may find it optimal to invest into risky projects offering no risk premium. The model has also a number of implications for firm dynamics supported by empirical evidence, such as a positive correlation between survival, size, and firm age.occupational choice, risk taking, firm dynamics, borrowing constraints.

A Theory of Financing Constraints and Firm Dynamics

There is widespread evidence supporting the conjecture that borrowing constraints have important implications for firm growth and survival. In this paper we model a multi-period borrowing/lending relationship with asymmetric information. We show that borrowing constraints emerge as a feature of the optimal long-term lending contract, and that such constraints relax as the value of the borrower's claim to future cash-flows increases. We also show that the optimal contract has interesting implications for firm dynamics. In agreement with the empirical evidence, as age and size increase, mean and variance of growth decrease, firm survival increases, and the sensitivity of investment to cash-flows declines.Optimal Contract, Borrowing Constraints, Moral Hazard, Survival.